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Abstract
Whereas the New Institutional Economics (NIE) is interested in the process of institution-
building and the evolution of institutions, legal scholars study law-making processes and their 
variations. The evolution of institutions and law-making are thus overlapping, but not identical, 
processes. This paper focuses on analysing a certain aspect of the evolution of law, namely 
the interplay between private and public law-making processes. The article aims to introduce 
some basic ideas and concepts regarding the complex interplay between private and public rule-
making as part of the process of the evolution of law, albeit from a NIE-perspective. It is argued 
that constitutional economics is a normative concept that has the capacity to provide a better 
understanding of the interplay between private and public rule-making.
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1 Introduction
Whereas the New Institutional Economics (NIE) is interested in the process of institution-
building and evolution of institutions,1 legal scholars study the law-making processes 
and their variations.2 The evolution of institutions and law-making are overlapping, but 
not identical, processes. Law-making – or the evolution of law – may be understood as 
a specific mode of the evolution of institutions, in so far as legal rules may be defined 
as ‘institutions’.
 This paper focuses on analysing a certain aspect of the evolution of law, namely the 
interplay between private rule-making and public rule-making processes. This aspect 
of rule-making will be analysed by applying the methodological instruments of New 
Institutional Economics. Parallel legal research in general, and especially in public 
international law3 (as interesting as it may be), will not be discussed here.
 Whereas the interface between private rule-making and public rule-making – i.e. 
‘hybrid rule-making’ – has been studied in a constitutional economics perspective by 
*  Professor Dr. iur. Dr. rer. pol. Dr. h.c. Christian Kirchner, LL.M. (Harvard), Humboldt University 
Berlin, School of Law / School of Business and Economics.
1 M. Eckhardt, ‘Institutionen- und evolutionsökonomische Erklärungen des Rechtswandels’, in W. Kerber 
(ed.), Studien zur evolutorischen Ökonomik (2004), at 165-200; T. Eger and P. Weise, ‘Die Evolution von 
Normen aus Unordnung. Ein synergetisches Modell’, in P. de Gijiesel (eds.), Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, 
Jahrbuch 11. Markt Macht und Moral (2000), at 192-209; H. Geue, Evolutionäre Institutionenökonomik 
(1997); M. Erlei, M. Leschke and D. Sauerland, Neue Institutionenoekonomik (2007), at 22; R. Richter and 
E.G. Furubotn, Neue Institutionenoekonomik (2011), at 7; V. Vanberg, ‘Rational Choice, Rule-Following 
and Institutions. An Evolutionary Perspective’, in U. Maeki, B. Gustafsson/C. Knudsen (eds.), Rationality, 
Institutions and Economic Methodology (1993), at 171-200.
2 G. Bachmann, ‘Privatrecht als Organisationsrecht. Grundlinien einer Theorie privateRechtsetzung’, in 
J.J. Zivilrechtswissenschaftler, Die Privatisierung des Privatrechts  rechtliche Gestaltung ohne staatlichen 
Zwang (2003), at 1-21; F. Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (1987); C. Kirchner ‘§ 5 Die oekonomische 
Theorie’, in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), Europaeische Methodenlehre (2010), at 134-158; S. Okruch, ‘Der 
Wandel von Rechtsnormen in evolutorischer Perspektive’, in G. Wegner and J. Wieland (eds.), Formelle 
und Informelle Institutionen: Genese, Interaktionen und Wandel (1998), at 101-151; S. Okruch, Innovation 
und Diffusion von Normen (1999); G.F. Schuppert, ‘Das Konzpet der regulierten Selbstregulierung als 
Bestandteil eines als Regelungswissenschaft verstandenen Rechtswissenschaft’, 4 Die Verwaltung, at 201-
252 (2001).
3 C. Kirchner, ‘The Power of Rational Choice Methodology in Guiding the Analysis and the Design of 
Public International Law Institutions’, 1 Illinois Law Review (Symposium Issue on International Law and 
Economics), at 419-428 (2008).
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Kirchner and Schmidt,4 the interplay between both types of rule-making has not been 
systematically analysed in the realm of New Institutional Economics.
 This analysis aims to introduce some basic ideas and concepts regarding the interplay 
between private and public rule-making as part of the process of the evolution of law 
from the NIE-perspective. The discussion will begin by distinguishing between the 
different types of rules, and will proceed by introducing the methodological instruments 
that will be applied. This will be followed by a brief examination of the specific features 
of public and private rule-making, which will lay the foundation for a concluding 
analysis of the more complex interplay between the two rule-making processes. 
2 Different Types of Rules
In NIE, institutions can be understood as formal or informal rules, or sets of rules, 
together with their enforcement mechanisms.5 Legal rules, or sets of legal rules, together 
with their enforcement mechanisms, can thus be defined as institutions. Legal rules 
without enforcement mechanisms do not qualify as institutions.
 From a NIE-perspective, the evolution of law is not synonymous with the evolution 
of institutions. This analysis focuses on the evolution of legal rules, which are effectively 
enforced. Rules which are not enforced or cannot be enforced are, in most cases, not 
relevant in the world of economics because they do not provide sanctions and incentives. 
They may, nevertheless, come into play if individuals are willing to follow such non-
enforceable rules for reasons other than sanctions and incentives. Such rules may carry 
certain values which are internalised by the addressees of such rules. However, such 
phenomena are normally outside the realm of institutional economics today. They may 
become a subject matter of the discipline when behavioural economics is in a position 
to provide better insight into the interplay between external incentive mechanisms and 
internal value-driven incentives. The present research on fairness is leading in this 
direction.6
 The distinction between formal and informal rules, as introduced by NIE-scholars,7 
is relevant for this analysis insofar as the process of creating informal rules may lead to 
rule-making. This might be an interesting topic with regard to the theory of rule-making; 
however, this topic is outside the interplay between private and public rule-making. The 
study of private rule-making starts with the process of formulating private-ordering 
rules and providing enforcement mechanisms for such rules. This rule-making process 
often starts with formalising existing informal rules. The analysis of this process of 
formalisation would exceed the scope of this paper.
 The distinction between formal and informal rules in NIE corresponds to the 
distinction between legal rules on the one side, and custom and usage on the other side 
of legal theory.8 In practice, however, it is not easy to draw the line between these two 
types of rules. One traditional test is to ask the question whether law courts incorporate 
customs and usages into customary law. Whereas the production of customary law is 
4 C. Kirchner and M. Schmidt, ‘Private Law-Making: IFRS – Problems of Hybrid Standard Setting’, 
in P. Nobel (ed.), International Standards and the Law (2005), at 67-82; C. Kirchner and M. Schmidt, 
‘Hybride Regelsetzung im Recht der Unternehmensrechnungslegung – Fehlentwicklungen im europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrecht’, 58 Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 4, at 387-407 (2006).
5 E.G. Furubotn and R. Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory (2005), at 7; referring to G. von 
Schmoller, Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre (1900), at 61; see also: Richter and Furubotn, 
above n. 1, at 7.
6 E. Fehr and K. Schmidt, ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation’, 114 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 3, at 817-868 (1999); E. Fehr and K. Schmidt, ‘Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Choices’, 
44 European Economic Review 4-6, at 1057-1068 (2000).
7 Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland, above n. 1, at 22; Furubotn and Richter, above n. 5, at 7; Richter and 
Furubotn, above n. 1, at 7, 8; S. Voigt Institutionenoekonomik (2009), at 20.
8 Custom does not, as such, constitute customary law without consent of a legally binding character to 
such a custom: B. Rüthers, C. Fischer and A. Birk, Rechtstheorie mit Juristischer Methodenlehre (2011), at 
147.
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an act of public rule-making, the development of customs and usages may (but not 
necessarily) lead to private rule-making. Thus, the creation of private rule-making via 
customs and usages is also outside the scope of this study.
 Conventional legal definitions of legal rules often exclude formal rules created by 
private standard setters or rule-making bodies (private rules or standards; privat gesetztes 
Recht).9 From an economics perspective, this very narrow definition of legal rules is not 
suitable for expounding the meaning of the evolution of law. Excluding private rules and 
standards would cause severe difficulties in understanding modern legal systems, which 
may be seen as a mix between rules produced by legislators and courts (public ordering), 
on the one hand, and private rules and standards on the other (private ordering).10 A 
narrow definition of legal rules would automatically focus the attention of the analysis 
on the process of transforming private non-legal rules into legal rules. Incorporating 
international financial reporting standards (IAS and IFSR) into European Union law by 
the endorsement mechanism provided for in the IAS-Regulation is an example of such 
a transformation process. This phenomenon has been studied in the context of hybrid 
rule-making.11
 For the purpose of this analysis, it makes sense to focus both on public rule-making 
(by legislative bodies and courts) and on private rule-making (by private organisations, 
standard setters and private contracting parties). These two modes of rule-making are 
characterised by different concepts of legitimisation. Whereas with public rule-making 
in democratic states, the source of legitimisation of law is acceptance of the rules of 
rule-making by the addressees of such rules, in private rule making, it is the consent of 
the rule-making private actors which legitimises such rules. As a consequence of this 
distinction, outsiders, although affected by such rules, are not part of the underlying 
consent and cannot be bound by such rules of private rule-making. One could 
reformulate this statement as follows: external effects of rules of private rule-making 
are not legitimised.
3 Methodological Issues
In order to study issues of evolution of legal rules and norms, one may look at various 
approaches of evolutionary economics.12 An approach based on the methodology of NIE 
offers the advantage of having the possibility to start with the basic assumptions of the 
New Institutional Economics and then to introduce the necessary elements for studying 
the evolution of institutions step by step. The starting points are the assumptions of 
scarce resources and methodological individualism.13 If individual actors have to 
make decisions on how to allocate scarce resources, it makes sense to add another 
assumption, that of self-interested rational behaviour. The actors may develop different 
strategies to overcome or at least to mitigate that scarcity of resources. In a world with 
division of labour, they have to co-ordinate their decisions and the decisions of other 
actors with whom they are interacting. Co-ordination of decisions might be improved 
if the interacting actors agree on enforceable rules which are binding on all of them. 
Rule-making thus appears to constitute a strategy to overcome or to mitigate scarcity 
of resources. Rule-making actors are confronted with two problems: (1) incomplete 
9 See Bachmann, above n. 2; Kirchhof, above n. 2; C. Kirchner, ‘Regulierung durch Unternehmens-
fuehrungskodizes (Codes of Corporate Governance)’, 45 Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 
at 93-120 (2002).
10 For the term private ordering see: O.E. Williamson, ‘The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering’, 92 
American Economic Review 1, at 438-443 (2002); for private ordering as a mode of cartelisation see: 
H. Kronstein, Das Recht der internationalen Kartelle (1967).
11 Kirchner and Schmidt (2005), above n. 4; Kirchner and Schmidt (2006), above n. 4.
12 F.A. von Hayek, Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren (1968); R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982); D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (1990); and J.A. Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1911/1987).
13 K. Arrow, ‘Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge’, 84 American Economic Review 2, 
at 3 (1994); C. Mantzavinos, Individuals, Institutions, and Markets (2001), at 3-7; and J.A. Schumpeter, 
Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen (1908/1952).
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information and (2) bounded rationality.14 They are not in a position to engage in rule-
making processes by simply defining certain goals and determining the ends to attain 
such goals (means and ends-paradigm).15 A purely constructivist approach is deemed to 
fail.16 But this insight does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that intentional rule-
making is meaningless. It rather suggests that in the light of incomplete information 
and bounded rationality, intentional activities in the field of rule-making will have 
unintended side-effects. It becomes necessary to make new rule-making decisions in 
the light of non-satisfactory results. Rule making becomes a trial-and-error process in 
which the participating actors acquire information which is helpful in making better 
decisions. Rule-making processes thus may be designed as incomplete contracts in 
which specification of obligations of the contracting parties is postponed to a point in 
time when they have sufficient information to make the decisions.
 The assumptions relating to scarcity of resources, methodological individualism, 
self-interested behaviour, incomplete information and bounded rationality support an 
understanding of rule-making as a learning process in which the participating actors 
make decisions as part of a search process. This concept of rule-making as a learning 
process relates to modern evolutionary economics,17 in particular, the evolutionary 
concepts of competition.18 It is therefore helpful to have a closer look into the specific 
features of different rule-making processes in order to understand the games of various 
actors participating in rule-making.
4 Public Rule-making
Public rule-making is different in civil law jurisdictions and in common law jurisdictions. 
In civil law jurisdictions, the legislator is the primary law-maker. According to the 
specific concept of the separation of powers, the judiciary is supposed to apply legislatory 
law, and is therefore the ‘mouth of the legislature’ (or the pouvoir nul).19 Judge-made 
law is created under the guise of interpreting legislatory law. Precedents are not legally 
(although often factually) binding. In common law jurisdictions the concept of the 
separation of powers is different: in a system of checks and balances, two competing 
lawmakers exist – the legislator and the courts. Precedents are legally binding (the 
stare decisis doctrine).20 Some authors argue that there remain few differences between 
judge-made law in civil law and in common law jurisdictions today; both jurisdictions 
are supposed to converge in this aspect.21 But this line of argument overlooks the 
14 R.B. Korobkin and T.S. Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics’, 88 California Law Review 4, at 1051-1144 (2000); and Mantzvinos, above 
n. 13, at 52.
15 F.A. von Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, 4 Economica 13, at 33-54 (1937); and M. Streit, Theorie 
der Wirtschaftspolitik (2005), at 270; Kirchner, above n. 2, at 140-141. 
16 F.A. von Hayek, Die Irrtuemer des Konstruktivismus (1975).
17 Mantzavinos, above n. 13, at 188-226; Vanberg, above n. 1; G. von Wangenheim, ‘Evolutionary 
Economics’, in D. C. Scott (ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and Society, Vol. 1 (2007); U. Witt, Individualistische 
Grundlagen der Evolutorischen Oekonomik (1987); and U. Witt, ‘Evolutionary Economics’, in S.N. Durlauf 
and L.E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Vol. 3 (2008), at 67-73.
18 Hayek (1968), above n. 12; W. Kerber, ‘Innovation, Handlungsrechte und evolutionärer Marktprozeß’, 
in U.Witt (ed.), Studien zur evolutorischen Oekonomik II (1992), at 171-195; W. Kerber, ‘Evolutorischer 
Wettbewerb. Zu den theoretischen und institutionellen Grundlagen der Wettbewerbsordnung’, (1994, 
unpublished thesis); and W. Kerber, ‘Wettbewerb als Hypothesentest: Eine evolutorische Konzeption 
wissenschaftenden Wettbewerbs’, in K. von Delhaes, U. Fehl and L. Balcerowicz (eds.), Dimensionen des 
Wettbewerbs (1997), at 27-29; Mantzavinos, above n. 13, at 188-226.
19 C. Kirchner, ‘The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany’, 11 International Review of 
Law and Economics 3, at 277-292 (1991).
20 Stare decisis translates as ‘stare decisis et non quiete movere’ (to stand by that which is decided); 
Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, source: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/> (Last 
visited 4 Dec. 2011). 
21 G. Hager, Rechtsmethoden in Europa (2009); and S. Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England 
und auf dem Kontinent. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung und ihrer historischen 
Grundlagen (2001).
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essential difference between legally binding and factually binding precedents.22 From a 
New Institutional Economics’ perspective, this difference is essential; it is more difficult 
to predict future judge-made law in civil law-jurisdictions using factually binding 
precedents than to make predictions under the stare decisis doctrine. However, this 
issue will not be discussed in detail here, since the evolution of law in common law 
jurisdictions will not be analysed in this paper. We shall instead focus on the evolution 
of law in civil law jurisdictions. 
 When studying the rule-making process in civil law jurisdictions, the analysis 
in most cases starts with a political decision, which either aims to deal with a new 
problem, or aims to improve existing solutions to existing problems. In a NIE-analysis 
of rule-making, it makes sense to understand legal rules and norms as ‘hypothetical 
problem solutions’.23 In modern civil law jurisdictions, the first step of the legislative 
rule-making process is, in most instances, preparatory work done by the administration, 
which then undergoes a process of modification by the legislative body. The problem 
of incomplete information for both actors participating in this rule-making process is 
that the result of this type of rule-making reflects the information available at the time 
of rule making. The hypothetical problem solution resulting from this process may 
be regarded as a hypothesis of how to deal with the politically defined problems. The 
underlying problem is that of the means-and-ends-paradigm. The problem solution may 
lead to unintended consequences for intentional activities.24 Looking at the rule-making 
process from an evolutionary perspective, the question arises how to deal with such 
unintended consequences, taking into account that the rule-making capacities of the 
executive branch and the legislative branch are limited. If an unintended consequence 
arises, the reaction of the public law-maker is relatively slow. Thus, the judiciary steps in. 
Applying the method of finality (teleological interpretation), courts engage in correcting 
and modifying legal rules of legislative law.25 The typical shortcomings of this type 
of judicial response (to the unintended consequences of legal rules of legislative law) 
are due to courts’ lack of satisfactory knowledge of facts and theoretical approaches 
of social sciences. Courts in civil law jurisdictions focus on legal problems and tend 
to neglect problems related to information as problems of inadequate social science 
methodological instruments for conducting impact analyses of alternative problem 
solutions. In this instance, the legislator might step in, if such rule-making capacities 
are available. One comparative advantage of the legislator as compared to the judiciary 
in the role of law-maker is the ability of the legislator to look into problem solutions 
which have been developed in other jurisdictions. Courts often lack the capacity or the 
willingness to make use of comparative legal studies. This was different in the past, 
when courts were known to have cited foreign cases more openly.26 However, even if the 
legislator does make use of this comparative method,27 the problem of legal transplants 
is still relevant:28 legal transplants do not necessarily lead to the same consequences in 
a different legal, social and economic environment.
22 Ruethers, Fischer and Birk, above n. 8, at 154-155.
23 Kerber (1997), above n. 18.
24 See sources cited supra n. 15.
25 H-J. Koch and H. Ruessmann, Juristische Begründungslehre (1982), at 222-227; Ruethers, Fischer and 
Birk, above n. 8, at 474-480.
26 R. Zimmermann, ‘Der europäische Charakter des englischen Rechts’, 1 Zeitschrift für Europaeisches 
Privatrecht, at 4-50 (1993); R. Zimmermann, ‘Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common 
law’, in P.C. Mueller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1993), 
at 47-70; and R. Zimmermann, ‘Roemisches Recht und europäische Rechtseinheit’, in W. Ludwig (ed.), 
Die Antike in der europaeischen Gegenwart, Veroeffentlichungen der Joachim Jungius Gesellschaft der 
Wissenschaften (1993), at 151-169.
27 For the comparative method, see A. Schwartze, ‘§ 4 Die Rechtsvergleichung’, in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), 
Europaeische Methodenlehre (2010), at 113-131.
28 J. von Hein, Die Rezeption US-amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland (2008), at 57; 
C. Kirchner, ‘Comparative Law and Institutional Economics – Legal Transplants in Corporate Governance’, 
in P. Nobel (ed.), New Frontiers of Law and Economics, Series in Law and Economics, First International 
Scientific Conference on Law and Economics at the University of St. Gallen, October 27-28, 2005 (2006) 
at 201-214.
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 The process of public rule-making changes in a setting of legislatory competition.29 
If addressees of legal rules and norms are free to opt out of their national jurisdictions 
on the basis of party autonomy granted by conflict of law-rules, it might make sense for 
national legislators to react to competing products of other legislators. This reaction is 
no longer simply based on the legislators’ interests in other problem solutions in other 
jurisdictions. If legislators want to stop ‘their own’ legal addressees from opting out of 
domestic law, they have to offer attractive legal rules. 
 From an evolutionary perspective, legislatory competition is important because rule-
making may be regarded as a production process in competitive markets. Addressees 
of legal rules and norms are no longer the victims of domestic legislators and courts 
that monopolise law-making in the field of applicable law. They are emancipated and 
become market participants. The rule-making has to meet their quality expectations 
and their preferences. From an economic perspective, this means that decentralised 
information becomes relevant. Legal addressees might have a better insight into the 
expected consequences of applicable legal rules and norms compared to the information 
of legislators and courts, which enjoy a monopoly position. However, the monopoly 
position of the legislator should not be over-emphasised. The legislator is part of a 
governance structure distinct from that of the market. The democratic feedback 
process should serve to limit the power of the legislator. Despite this, deficiencies in 
public governance structures reduce the power of citizens as principals and provide 
discretionary power for legislators. Thus, legislatory competition improves the position 
of the addressees of legal rules and norms: it adds exit to voice.30 Because of this exit 
option, legislators have to take into account the quality standard preferences of the 
addressees of legal rules and norms.
 Even if legislatory competition improves the process of public rule-making, a caveat 
should be considered, namely that of legal transplants (as mentioned above). A public 
law-maker cannot easily copy problem solutions of competing legislators. One further 
caveat to be added: the addressees of legal rules and norms are not solely affected by 
the products of the legislator. If they opt for another legal regime, they are buying not 
only into legislative law, but also into judge-made law, which has been produced by 
interpreting legislative legal rules and norms.31 
5 Private Rule-making
5.1 Types of Private Rule-making
As has been previously mentioned, there are different types of private law making. We 
shall focus on three types which appear to be especially important: (1) private standard-
setting, (2) private codes of conduct, and (3) private contracting. 
29 E. Carbonara and F. Parisi,‘Bargaining for Legal Harmonization: Jurisdictional Competition and Legal 
Obsolescence’, in T. Eger et al. (eds.), Internationalization of the Law and its Economic Analysis (2008), 
at 339-352; K. Heine Regulierungswettbewerb im Gesellschaftsrecht. Zur Funktionsfaehigkeit eines 
Wettbewerbs der Rechtsordnungen im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht (2003); K. Heine and W. Kerber, 
‘European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence’, 13 European Journal of Law 
and Economics 1, at 47-71 (2002); W. Kerber, ‘Interjurisdictional competition within the European Union’, 
23 Fordam International Law Journal, at 216-249 (2000); C. Kirchner, R. Painter and W. Kaal, ‘Regulatory 
Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product for Europe’, 
2 European Company and Financial Law Review 2, at 160-171 (2005); H. Merkt, ‘Das Europaeische 
Gesellschaftsrecht und die Idee des “Wettbewerbs der Gesetzgeber” ’, 59 RabelsZ, at 545-568 (1995); E. 
O-Hara and L. Ribstein, The Law Market (2009); and N. Reich,‘Competition Between Legal Orders: A 
New Paradigm of Law?’, 29 Common Market Law Review, at 861-896 (1992).
30 On exit and voice see: A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States (1970).
31 Kirchner, Painter and Kaal, above n. 29.
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5.1.1 Private Standard-setting
Private standard-setting has been the subject of numerous studies.32 From a NIE-
perspective, the crucial questions include how private standard-setting copes with the 
problem of incomplete information and how it deals with the problem of unintended 
side effects. Standard-setting by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
may serve as an example for this purpose. Standard-setting is based on a sequence of 
draft proposals, comments by interested parties and standard-setting decisions made by 
a standard-setting body. Because of the non-binding nature of such standards (at least in 
the absence of hybrid rule-making), the standard setter has to anticipate the willingness 
of future users of the standards to apply them. Thus, private standard-setting has some 
qualifications in a market process. But this depends to a large extent on the existence 
of competing standard setters. Cartelisation of standard setters may be understood as 
mitigating competitive pressure. In euphemistic terminology, cartelisation is called 
harmonisation or agreement on world-wide standards. Eliminating competitive 
pressure leads to a reduction of information in the standard-setting process. If competing 
standards exist, a comparative analysis can provide additional information on the 
expected outcome of proposed standards. 
 In the same way as public rule-making, private standard-setting interpretations of 
existing standards are a common mode of rule-making.33 Such interpretations may be 
used to deal with unanticipated problems. The problem solution thus is similar – but not 
identical – to the production of judge-made law in public rule-making. 
5.1.2 Private Codes of Conduct
Today, private codes of conduct are a common concept of private rule-making. Examples 
include take-over codes34 and corporate governance codes.35 An examination of the 
process of rule-making in the context of the German Corporate Governance Code36 
reveals some interesting features of an evolutionary rule-making process. The starting 
point of this rule-making process was the installation of a government commission, 
which was mandated to write a non-binding set of rules for corporate governance of 
German capital market-oriented corporations. The Code distinguishes between different 
types of provisions, ranging from quasi-binding provisions to recommendations. The 
provisions comprising the Code were not derived from actual practice of corporate 
governance in Germany (inductive approach), but were intended to constitute rules for 
good governance (deductive approach). What constitutes good governance is defined 
by the consent of the members of the government commission. Thus, in essence, the 
product is not purely private rule-making but rather looks like hybrid rule-making. 
32 Bachmann, above n. 2; C. Kirchner, ‘New Institutional Arrangements in International Economic Law: 
The Working of Codes of Conduct’, in H.J. Vosgerau (ed.), New Institutional Economics for the World 
Economy (1989), at 409-435; Kirchner and Schmidt (2005), above n. 4; Kirchner and Schmidt (2006), 
above n. 4; M. Schmidt, ‘On the Legitimacy of Accounting Standard Setting by Privately Organised 
Institutions in Germany and Europe’, 54 Schmalenbach Business Review, at 171-193 (2002).
33 See C. Kirchner, ‘Zur Interpretation von internationalen Rechnungslegungsstandards: das 
Problem”hybrider Rechtsfortbildung” ’, in D. Schneider, D. Rueckle, H-U. Kuepper and F.W. Wagner 
(eds.), Kritisches zu Rechnungslegung und Unternehmensbesteuerung. Festschrift zur Vollendung des 65. 
Lebensjahres von Theodor Siegel (2005), at 201-217.
34 C. Kirchner and U. Ehricke, ‘Funktionsdefizite des Uebernahmekodex der Boersensach-
verstaendigenkommission’, 43 Die Aktiengesellschaft, at 105-116 (1998); C. Kirchner and M. Schmidt, 
‘Private Law-Making: IFRS – Problems of Hybrid Standard Setting’, in P. Nobel (ed.) International 
Standards and the Law (2005), at 67-76; and E. Schanze, ‘International Standards – Functions and Links to 
Law’, in P. Nobel (ed.), International Standards and the Law (2005), at 83-103.
35 Kirchner, above n. 9.
36 German Corporate Governance Code, as amended on 26 May 2010: <http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/kodex_2010/German-Corporate-Governance-Code-2010.pdf> (Last visited 5 Dec. 
2011).
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Acceptance of the provisions of the Code is measured annually.37 If acceptance 
diminishes, there are two different problem solutions: (1) amendment of the provisions 
in question in order to improve acceptance, or (2) a request that the public law-maker 
promulgate enforceable legal provisions that are created within the governance structure 
of legislative law-making (see supra section 4 ‘public rule-making’), but which do not 
have to be accepted by legal addressees. In light of these two options, the learning 
process, by way of dialogue between the government commission and the addressees, 
is more or less comparable to that of public rule-making. The commission functions as 
a legislator, but without the legitimisation of a democratically elected legislator. The 
expectation that a quasi-private law-maker has better access to information, and is more 
flexible compared to a public law-maker, is therefore not met.
5.1.3 Private Contracting
Private parties engage in drafting and concluding contracts which extend beyond existing 
contracts. They not only invent new provisions and new types of contracts, but develop 
new forms of transactions and cooperation. Incomplete contracts are today not only a 
field of interest for legal practitioners and scholars, but increasingly for economists.38 
From our perspective of the evolution of law, incomplete contracts are a fascinating 
phenomenon. They cope with the problem of incomplete information by leaving open 
issues which can be better dealt with in the future in light of improved information. 
The learning process is built into the contract. However, the price is high: a contracting 
party that makes specific investments in such an incomplete contract may become the 
victim of a hold-up (i.e. of ex post-opportunism of the other contracting party). From 
an evolutionary perspective, this problem of ex post-opportunism leads to solutions 
according to which procedural rules and allocation of competences become more 
relevant than substantial rules. The awareness of incomplete information is an incentive 
to engage in rule-making of meta-rules for the contract. However, there are potential 
unintended consequences of promulgating such meta-rules: the contracting parties 
may lack sufficient information to promulgate effective meta-rules. Thus, incomplete 
contracts may be understood as drafting rules in a learning process for governing future 
transactions between the contracting parties. Procedural rules and rules on the allocation 
of competences are inherently incomplete. It is interesting to note that informal rules 
come into play at this point. They are especially important in Japanese contracts and 
serve as a device through which to mitigate the effects of ex post-opportunism.39 
6 Interplay Between Private and Public Rule-making
6.1 Private Rule-making Endeavours as a Starting Point of Evolution of 
Law
Given the decentralised allocation of information, it makes sense to start with private 
rule-making. Let us begin with the problem of organising capital markets. Building 
a market platform – e.g. a stock exchange – requires rule-making in order to create 
market access. Financial reporting standards may be understood as safeguarding the 
quality of products that are traded on a market platform. Private actors have access 
to information which might be required in order to safeguard the quality of marketed 
37 A. von Werder and J. Böhme, ‘Corporate Governance Report 2011’, in 64 Der Betrieb part I, at 1285-
1290; part II, at 1345-1353 (2011).
38 O. Hart and J. Moore, ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’, 66 Review of Economic Studies 1, at 115-
138 (1999); E. Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract 
and Corporation’, in C. Joerges (ed.), Franchising and the Law. Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, Vol. 153 
(1991); E. Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Arrangements’, 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE) 4, at 691-697 (1993); and Schanze, above n. 34.
39 C.F. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan (2008), at 322; H-P. Marutschke, Einfuehrung in das 
japanische Recht (2010), at 10.
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products. Financial reporting standards may thus be regarded as devices designed to 
reduce information asymmetries between sellers and buyers of financial instruments. 
The incentive for creating standards is to make the market platform attractive and thus 
more profitable. This is an incentive comparable to the incentive in a product market to 
create new products and to safeguard their quality.
 When it comes to codes of conducts as examples of private rule-making, the argument 
in favour of private standard-setting might also be brought into play. Members of a 
private rule-making body might enjoy superior information compared to public law-
makers. Furthermore, they may be in a better position to respond more quickly to new 
information. However, if the private rule-making body acts like a public rule-making 
body, such comparative advantages may be at risk of fading away.
 In the field of private contracting, the comparative advantages of private rule-making 
vis-à-vis public rule-making are evident. Public law-makers do not have comparable 
access to necessary information. 
 Private rule-making in the various fields of law is the product of comparative 
advantage of private rule-makers over public rule-makers; private rule-makers have 
better access to necessary information. They are experts in the field of rule-making. 
Thus, they are able to react quickly to a changing environment.
6.2 Response of Public Rule-making
6.2.1 Preliminary Considerations
There are some general explanations why the public law-maker responds to private rule-
making endeavours. The first explanation relates to a transaction cost consideration. 
If private law-makers have created different rules and norms, the public law-maker 
may step in and reduce transaction costs by offering either standardised default rules 
or standardised cogent rules. Both types of rules encompass different effects. In case 
of standardised cogent rules, the price for such standardisation and transaction cost 
reduction is a reduction of options. Phrased in legal terminology, private autonomy 
is curtailed. The learning process is affected considerably, thus counterbalancing the 
positive effects of transaction cost reduction. In the case of standardised default rules, 
private parties are free to decide whether or not to make use of the new legal rules. The 
parties themselves weigh effects from transaction cost reduction and effects from tailor-
made rules on the basis of private law-making.
 The second explanation concerns an externality argument. Private rule-making may 
create externalities for non-participating outsiders. Internalisation of such external 
effects by Coasean negotiations may not work in light of insurmountable transaction 
costs. The public law-maker then steps in and eliminates or internalises externalities. 
The aim is to better legitimise legal rules and norms. However, the price to be paid 
might be high: the learning process might be affected. And it is not certain that public 
rule-making creates new externalities, especially if private actors invest in lobbying. 
6.2.2 Responses to Private Standard-setting
Private standard-setting may easily create externalities. This is a well-known 
phenomenon in competition law and is usually referred to as exclusionary effects.40 
Insiders may use their standard-setting power in order to systematically discriminate 
against factual or potential competitors. However, once again, it has to be taken into 
account that the public law-maker may further this discrimination under the influence 
of lobbying. This is especially true if private rule-making is substituted not by public 
rule-making, but by hybrid rule-making.
40 I.e. the exclusionary effects of standardisation. 
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6.2.3 Responses to Private Codes of Conduct
As has been mentioned in the case of private codes of conduct, the public law-maker 
may transform provisions of private codes into statutory law. Two alternatives are given: 
(1) in case of overall acceptance of private code provisions, the public law-maker may 
step in and reduce transaction costs, and (2) in case of a lack of acceptance of private 
code provisions, the public law-maker may create binding statutory provisions. The 
latter case may be the result of lobbying of the private (or semi-private) rule-making 
body (e.g. a government commission). There may even be cases of collusion between 
the rule-making body and government officials in charge of appointing members of the 
commission in question. 
6.2.4 Responses to Private Contracting
In case of private contracting, the response of public rule-making may be provided by 
the legislator or the judiciary. In most cases, courts will have to deal with the problems 
of private contracting if one of the parties takes legal action in a public law court. Court 
decisions will then define the limits of private rule-making by testing the compatibility 
of provisions of private contracting and binding statutory (or case) law. A possible 
response – or anticipated response – of private parties engaged in private contracting is 
the use of arbitration clauses.
 The legislator may become active and create legislatory law in order to reduce 
transaction costs, but the price to be paid might be a slow-down of the learning process. 
6.3 Responses of Private Rule-making Actors to Public Rule-makers’ 
Responses
Private rule-making actors may respond to public law-makers’ responses. The general 
explanation for this ‘response to a response’ is that private law-making actors are not 
convinced that the problem solutions provided by public law-makers are superior to 
their own. Rules of conflict of law come into play. Whereas the public law-maker is, 
in essence, confined to the national jurisdiction – where costs of supranational and/
or international co-operation may be tremendous – private law-makers may act at the 
international level. This is especially the case in the field of private contracting – such 
contracts can be denationalised; private parties may conclude self-enforceable contracts. 
The national public law-maker may still engage in creating binding legal rules and 
norms. However, they can only bind private actors who are not able to opt out. In the 
field of legislatory competition, with respect to corporate law, it might be possible to 
opt out of national laws if private law-makers are able to write their own corporate 
law, include arbitration clauses and find a nation state which is willing to adopt that 
corporate law as national law.41
6.4 The Interplay Between Private and Public Rule-Makers as a Learning 
Process
The interplay between private and public rule-makers can be understood as a learning 
process. Decentralised knowledge is utilised by private rule-makers. They induce a 
learning process for the public rule-maker. However, public rule-making is confined to 
knowledge existing at the time of such rule-making. Private rule-makers are in a position 
to react quicker to new emerging decentralised knowledge compared to the public rule-
maker. By forcing the public rule-maker to react, they again create incentives for a 
learning process for the public rule-maker.
41 Kirchner, Painter and Kaal, above n. 29, at 191-206.
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6.5 The Interplay Between Private and Public Rule-Makers as a 
Legitimisation Process
The interplay between private and public rule-makers may be understood as a 
legitimisation process. Private rule-makers lacking legitimisation to create binding rules 
for outsiders produce externalities. Due to very high transaction costs, such externalities 
can be dealt with by a Coasean negotiation solution. Those actors, being affected by 
the externalities, may (and often will) ask the public rule-maker to intervene. If such 
intervention creates a pay-off for the actors participating in the public rule-making 
process – e.g. by getting more votes in public elections – the public rule-maker will 
step in and protect the victims. However, due to the comparative information advantage 
of the private rule-maker, there will be endeavours to circumvent public rules and to 
start the game again. The process is driven by the existing information asymmetry and 
incentives for both sides to promote their relative position.
7 Concluding Remarks
The evolution of law can be better understood if the interplay of private and public rule-
making is taken into consideration. What is necessary is to develop a more stringent 
structure for this type of analysis and to arrive at normative conclusions. One normative 
concept which may be used is that of constitutional economics, which has previously 
been applied to hybrid rule-making. 

